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Abstract
Paraconsistent logics are non-classical logics which allow non-trivial
and consistent reasoning about inconsistent axioms. They have been pro-
posed as a formal basis for handling inconsistent data, as commonly arise
in human enterprises, and as methods for fuzzy reasoning, with applica-
tions in Artificial Intelligence and the control of complex systems.
Formalisations of paraconsistent logics usually require heroic mathe-
matical efforts to provide a consistent axiomatisation of an inconsistent
system. Here we use transreal arithmetic, which is known to be consis-
tent, to arithmetise a paraconsistent logic. This is theoretically simple
and should lead to efficient computer implementations.
We introduce the metalogical principle of monotonicity which is a very
simple way of making logics paraconsistent.
Our logic has dialetheaic truth values which are both False and True.
It allows contradictory propositions, allows variable contradictions, but
blocks literal contradictions. Thus literal reasoning, in this logic, forms an
on-the-fly, syntactic partition of the propositions into internally consistent
sets. We show how the set of all paraconsistent, possible worlds can be
represented in a transreal space. During the development of our logic we
discuss how other paraconsistent logics could be arithmetised in transreal
arithmetic.
Keywords: transreal arithmetic, paraconsistent logic.
1 Introduction
Paraconsistent logics were explicitly introduced in the second half of the twen-
tieth century as non-classical logics that can reason about inconsistent axioms
[26][13]. In a classical logic, inconsistent axioms explode, allowing any theorem
to be proved in a trivial way [11]. By contrast paraconsistent logics do not
explode, they allow only limited conclusions to be drawn from inconsistent ax-
ioms. Some paraconsistent logics admit dialetheias, that is propositions which
are both False and True [24], and some admit Gap values with no component of
falsity or truthfulness [29]. Gap values are usually treated absorptively so that
any logical combination with a Gap produces a Gap as result. This behaviour
is consistent with one reading [20] of Frege’s principle of compositionallity so
that a compound proposition lacks reference if any component of it lacks refer-
ence. It should be added that paraconsistent logics are also capable of classical
reasoning so they provide a robust generalisation of classical logic. This makes
them interesting both from a theoretical and a practical perspective.
It has been proposed that paraconsistent logics are suitable for implementing
fuzzy logical systems, including the control of complex systems [34][10], for prac-
tical reasoning about inconsistent data, such as the data typically provided by
humans, for use in Artificial Intelligence programs, for human use in developing
scientific theories that contain contradictory elements, and more [26].
Paraconsistent logics are usually formalised in terms of advanced mathe-
matics. Shramko [29] reviews some logics using small, discrete, ordered sets of
truth values; these are mathematically simple, though one of the logics uses two
orderings. Logics with more than two orderings are discussed in [30]. Some
paraconsistent logics partition propositions into a hierarchy of internally consis-
tent partitions.
Here we take the simpler approach of expressing a paraconsistent logic arith-
metically. We use transreal arithmetic, which is a generalisation of real arith-
metic. Transreal arithmetic was originally developed [2][3] from a subset of the
algorithms used in the arithmetic of fractions. It has been axiomatised and a
machine proof of consistency has been given [8]. Two human proofs of consis-
tency are known but neither has been published to date. The algorithms of
transreal arithmetic are explained, particularly clearly, in a recent treatment,
in which transcomplex numbers are also introduced [5].
We develop a paraconsistent logic by expressing the Sheffer Stroke [9] as an
operation in transreal arithmetic. The Sheffer Stroke can be used to develop all
classical, truth functional logics [9] (See entry “Sheffer Stroke”), [28] (p. 29) so
our paraconsistent logic is just one example from an entire class of paraconsistent
generalisations of classical logic. During the development of our logic we explain
the motivation for each of the design decisions and consider alternatives so as
to assist readers in developing their own paraconsistent logics that use transreal
arithmetic as a consistent basis.
The Sheffer Stroke is better known, in Electronic Engineering, as the Not-
And operation, NAND [28]. It can be used to develop all of the logic circuits
in digital computers. By generalising the NAND gate to paraconsistent form,
we create the possibility of fabricating paraconsistent processors in hardware.
We briefly consider features of high-level, computer languages that implement
paraconsistent logics. This may be of interest to practitioners of Artificial In-
telligence and Cybernetics (control theory).
2 Paraconsistent Logic
2.1 Truth Values
The transreal numbers are just the real numbers augmented with three non-
finite numbers: negative infinity (−∞), positive infinity (∞) and nullity (Φ).
Nullity is absorptive over the elementary arithmetical operations so that when
it is involved in a sum, difference, product or quotient, the result is nullity.
However nullity is not universally absorptive, it may be an element of arbitrary
mappings. Nullity is the only unordered number in transreal arithmetic [8][7].
Nullity’s absorptive properties make it a good candidate for a Gap value
that has no degree of falsity or truthfulness.
The utility of a Gap value can be illustrated with the well known fairy story
of Goldilocks and the Three Bears. Goldilocks is interested in predicates con-
cerning porridge. She wants to know the truth values of too cold(porridge),
too hot(porridge), just right(porridge). But suppose Goldilocks’ reasoning sys-
tem is presented with the logical argument porridge, devoid of a predicate. What
is she to do? The argument porridge is a signifier for boiled oats that lie in a
bowl in front of her. Neither the signifier nor the actual boiled oats are in the
class of things that can be assigned degrees of falsity or truthfulness. Reflecting
on her difficulty, Goldilocks may decide to assign a Gap value, that is a value
with no degree of falsity or truthfulness, to the signifier porridge. Going further
she may decide to apply Gap values to all badly formed formulas of logic and
to everything that cannot be assigned a degree of falsity or truthfulness, such
as actual boiled oats. This makes Goldilocks’ reasoning system total. She can
assign a logical value to every possible sentence, including meta sentences that
consider the properties of actual objects, such as boiled oats, being presented
directly to her reasoning system. Notice that we must say “sentence” here, not
“predicate,” if we are to admit badly formed formulae. We hope we have done
enough to convey the utility of a Gap value to the reader.
We define that negative infinity is classical False and positive infinity is
classical True. This has the merit that we have now used up all of the non-
finite, transreal numbers, leaving all of the real numbers to convey dialetheaic
degrees of falsity and truthfulness.
In the next subsection we use arithmetical negation (unary subtraction) to
model logical negation, thereby exploiting the following idempotence of transreal
arithmetic: −(∞) = −∞,−(−∞) = ∞. Many, perhaps most, paraconsistent
logics will use some kind of idempotent negation but, perhaps, one that cycles
through many truth values, not just two. But not all logics have an idempotent
negation. For example many computer languages use zero for False and any non-
zero value for True. This is exploited in cases, such as memory management,
where an applications programmer instructs the assignment of memory and is
returned a single value by the operating system. If the returned value is non-
zero, it is True that the operating system has assigned memory and the returned
value is the base address of that memory but if the returned value is zero then
it is False that the operating system has assigned memory. In such languages
the negation of any True value is the unique False value but the negation of
the unique False value is exactly one, fixed one, of the True values. In this
case negation is not idempotent on the truth values but it is idempotent on the
classes from which the specific truth values are drawn. One might even want
continuous forms of negation implemented, say, as rotations in the complex
plane, or one might want continuous blends of negation with other operators
[4]. Yet other kinds of negation might be wanted.
If we were to model logical negation with the arithmetical reciprocal then
we might chose to model False with zero and True with infinity so that negation
is supplied by the transreal idempotence 1/0 = ∞, 1/∞ = 0. This approach
is taken by Gomide [18]; while logically sufficient, the operators are not total
functions of the transreal numbers, which complicates the application of ad-
vanced mathematics to such a system. The computation of reciprocals also has
more numerical error or higher computational cost than the arithmetisation used
here. Of course logical negation can be modelled in many other arithmetical
ways, including by arbitrary mappings.
If a fuzzy or statistical system is wanted then we work with probabilities, in
which case transreal numbers outside the range from zero to one, inclusive, arise
only in the underlying frequencies. Recall [17][15] that a statistical frequency,
f = o/e, is the ratio of the number of target outcomes, o, to the number of
experiments, e. This admits all non-negative, rational frequencies. The non-
negative, irrational frequencies are admitted via probability density functions.
The non-negative, non-finite, transreal numbers are also valid frequencies. Nul-
lity, Φ = 0/0, is the frequency where no target outcomes have occurred in no
experiments, say where a coin is held on its edge, between two leaves of a table,
before it is tossed, in an experiment to determine whether heads lie face-up on
the coin when it comes to rest. Infinity,∞ = k/0 = 1/0, for all positive k, is the
frequency where a positive number of outcomes, say one, occurs in no experi-
ments, say where the frequency of heads is wanted in a coin tossing experiment,
where the coin lies heads-up on a table before it is tossed for the first time.
These examples might strike the reader as artificial but they are needed to
make statistics total. The reader might be more satisfied by an example that
commonly occurs in statistical packages: what is the arithmetical mean of a list
of no numbers? Suppose the number of elements, in the list, is accumulated in
the variable n and the sum is accumulated in the variable s then the mean is
computed as s/n. We program defensively by setting the accumulators to an
initial value of zero: n = s = 0. When the program handles an empty list, n
and s are not incremented, which correctly records that there are no, that is
zero, elements in the list and that they have no, that is zero, sum. The program
then computes the mean as n/s = 0/0 = Φ. No special handling of the empty
list is required, no matter what complexity of statistical computation follows.
Thus transreal arithmetic simplifies computer code, removes all arithmetical
exceptions from syntactically correct, transarithmetical sentences and provides
a consistent basis for fuzzy and statistical, paraconsistent logics.
Returning now to our paraconsistent logic, we define that the real numbers
encode degrees of both falsity and truthfulness. The negative real numbers are
more False than True, the positive, real numbers are more True than False,
zero is equally False and True. We relate the degree of falsity and truthfulness
monotonically to the number modelling the truth value so that negative infinity
is entirely False, that is classically False, and positive infinity is entirely True,
that is classically True. The reader might want to impose specific monotonic
functions so as to obtain particular metrics. In this regard the transreal arct-
angent function [7] might be helpful because it maps a linear, transreal angle
onto nullity and the whole range of transreal numbers from negative infinity
to positive infinity. Nullity is the unique Gap value. Thus all transreal num-
bers are used in our paraconsistent logic, making it both total and consistent.
(The reader, being educated in logical terminology, will not confuse total and
consistent with complete and consistent.)
2.2 Metalogical Principle of Monotonicity
We have a metalogical intuition that a conclusion can depart no more from being
equally False and True than the most divergent of its premises. No matter how
an inference is constructed, this is sufficient to cut off all those conclusions that
are more divergent so the inference is generally non-explosive.
In our model the absolute value of the conclusion can be no greater than
the greatest absolute value of its premises. We operate on absolute values,
not signed values, to allow the possibility of a conclusion being the negation
of some one or more of its premises. Indeed we are forced into this strategy
by implementing our paraconsistent logic in terms of the Sheffer Stroke which
involves a negation.
Enforcing metalogical monotonicity on all logical operators is a very simple
way to make a logic paraconsistent.
2.3 Sheffer Stroke
It is known that the truth functional (Boolean) operators for logical negation
(not, ¬), logical conjunction (and, &), and logical disjunction (or, ∨) are func-
tionally complete [9] (See entry “Sheffer Stroke” ), [28] (p. 29) so that any
truth functional operators can be derived from these three. In fact it is known
that the sets {¬,&} and {¬,∨} are each functionally complete but it serves our
purpose better to consider the wider set of operators {¬,&,∨}.
We begin by introducing the transreal minimum and maximum functions,
which we use to define paraconsistent versions of the classical negation, con-
junction and disjunction operators. We use negative infinity (−∞) to model
classical False (F) and positive infinity (∞) to model classical True (T). We use
nullity (Φ) to model the logical Gap value (G). Note that only the real num-
bers model dialetheaic truth values. The three non-finite numbers each model a
single truth value: −∞ models classical False,∞ models classical True, Φ mod-
els Gap. We then prove that the paraconsistent operators contain the classical
ones. With a little extra work we prove that the paraconsistent operators are
well defined for all transreal arguments when we assume that the finite, truth
values are arranged monotonically with the real numbers that model them. We
then define a paraconsistent version of the Sheffer Stroke (|). There are three,
well known, identities that relate the classical Sheffer Stroke to classical nega-
tion, conjunction and disjunction. We show that these identities hold when we
substitute the paraconsistent Sheffer Stroke and the paraconsistent negation,
conjunction and disjunction. Thus we prove that the paraconsistent operators
are defined everywhere and are consistent with their classical counterparts.
We begin by defining the binary, transreal, minimum and maximum func-
tions so that the minimum of two transreal numbers is the least, ordered one
of them or else is nullity. Similarly the maximum of two transreal numbers is
the greatest, ordered one of them or else is nullity. These definitions rely on
the three transreal relations less-than, equal-to, greater-than as axiomatised in
[8] and explicated in [6]. It is sufficient for the reader to know that: nullity
is the uniquely unordered, transreal number so it is the only transreal number
that compares not-less-than, not-equal-to and not-greater than any other dis-
tinct number; negative infinity is the least, ordered, transreal number; positive
infinity is the greatest, ordered, transreal number.
Definition 1. Transreal minimum,
min(a, b) =

a : a < b
a : a = b
a : b = Φ
b : b < a
b : a = Φ
.
Definition 2. Transreal maximum,
max(a, b) =

a : a > b
a : a = b
a : b = Φ
b : b > a
b : a = Φ
.
The minimum and maximum functions, just defined, treat nullity non-absorptively
but we chose to treat the logical Gap value absorptively.
Definition 3. Paraconsistent conjunction,
a & b =
{
Φ : a = Φ or b = Φ
min(a, b) : otherwise
.
Definition 4. Paraconsistent disjunction,
a ∨ b =
{
Φ : a = Φ or b = Φ
max(a, b) : otherwise
.
We now define the paraconsistent, logical negation as transarithmetical nega-
tion.
Definition 5. Paraconsistent negation, ¬a = −a.
Transreal arithmetic has −0 = 0, −Φ = Φ and in all other cases, the negation
is distinct so that −a 6= a.
The Sheffer Stroke (|) may be defined as an infix operator but we follow the
more modern practice of taking it as a post-fix operator so that no bracketing
is needed. This leads to shorter and clearer formulae.
Definition 6. Paraconsistent Sheffer Stroke, ab| = ¬(a & b), with all symbols
read paraconsistently.
We now prove that the paraconsistent negation, conjunction and disjunction
contain their classical counterparts and that the paraconsistent operators are
well defined for all transreal arguments.
Theorem 7. Paraconsistent negation contains classical negation.
Proof. Classical negation has ¬F = T and ¬T = F. Equivalently paraconsistent
negation has ¬(−∞) = −(−∞) =∞ and ¬∞ = −∞.
Theorem 8. Paraconsistent conjunction contains classical conjunction.
Proof. Classical conjunction has F & F = F; F & T = F; T & F = F; T & T = T.
Equivalently paraconsistent conjunction has −∞ & −∞ = min(−∞,−∞) =
−∞; −∞ & ∞ = min(−∞,∞) = −∞; ∞ & − ∞ = min(∞,−∞) = −∞;
∞ & ∞ = min(∞,∞) =∞.
Theorem 9. Paraconsistent disjunction contains classical disjunction.
Proof. Classical disjunction has F ∨ F = F; F ∨ T = T; T ∨ F = T; T ∨ T = T.
Equivalently paraconsistent disjunction has −∞ ∨ −∞ = max(−∞,−∞) =
−∞; −∞ ∨ ∞ = max(−∞,∞) = ∞; ∞ ∨ −∞ = max(∞,−∞) = ∞;
∞ ∨ ∞ = max(∞,∞) =∞.
Theorem 10. Paraconsistent negation, conjunction, and disjunction are well
defined for all transreal arguments.
Proof. Paraconsistent negation, conjunction, and disjunction are defined for all
transreal arguments. It remains only to show that these operators are mono-
tonic. Firstly nullity is absorptive in these operators so that if any argument is
nullity the result is nullity. Nullity is disjoint from all other transreal numbers
because it is the uniquely isolated point of transreal space [7], therefore nullity
results are disjoint from all other transreal results and cannot contradict them.
Secondly the preceding three theorems show that the paraconsistent operators
are well defined at the boundaries −∞ and ∞ but, by definition, the non-
nullity, paraconsistent, truth values are monotonic so the operators just defined
are monotonic for all transreal t in the range −∞ ≤ t ≤ ∞. This completes the
proof for all transreal arguments.
We now derive the paraconsistent negation, conjunction and disjunction from
formulae involving the paraconsistent Sheffer Stroke. This proves that the para-
consistent Sheffer Stroke is functionally complete both for classical truth values
and for the paraconsistent truth values defined here.
Theorem 11. pp| = ¬p for all transreal p.
Proof. pp| = ¬(p & p) = ¬p, with all symbols read paraconsistently.
Theorem 12. pq|pq|| = p & q for all transreal p, q.
Proof. pq|pq|| = (¬(p & q))(¬(p & q))| = ¬(¬(p & q)) = p & q, with all symbols
read paraconsistently.
Theorem 13. pp|qq|| = p ∨ q for all transreal p, q.
Proof. pp|qq|| = (¬p) (¬q) | = ¬((¬p) & (¬q)) = p ∨ q by the classical de
Morgan’s Law, generalised to all transreal numbers by monotonicity and the
absorptiveness of nullity, with all symbols read paraconsistently.
2.4 Logical Space
Figure 1: Two Bands of the Possible Worlds Rainbow
Wittgenstein discusses the concept of a logical space [16]. We now construct
a transreal space of all paraconsistent, possible worlds whose predicates take on
transreal truth values, including subsets such as real and Boolean truth values.
Firstly we note that the set of transreal numbers {t : −∞ ≤ t ≤ ∞, t = Φ}
can be mapped onto, t′, a line segment, with a length of one half of a unit,
augmented by the point at nullity, using the transreal arctangent [7] as t′ =
arctan(t)/2pi. Thus all of the transreal, truth values for a single predicate can
be mapped onto a half-unit line-segment, augmented with the point at nullity.
Secondly we list the countable infinitude of predicates, pi, in some fixed
order, with i running over the strictly positive integers. We then lay off the
truth values of the ith predicate in a half-unit segment from i to i + 1/2, with
the point at nullity at i+ 3/4. A possible world has exactly one transreal, truth
value or, equivalently, exactly one geometrical point, in the ith union of the ith
line segment and ith point at nullity. Thus points on a half-infinite line encodes
one possible world.
Thirdly we rotate the half-infinite line by a full rotation and index each
radius by a real angle, θ, in the range 0 ≤ θ < 2pi. As each distinct radius is
a distinct possible world, we have constructed a continuum of possible worlds
whose cardinality is just sufficient to model the set of all possible worlds. To
see the sufficiency of the cardinality note that we may select the truth values
in one line segment with the cardinality of the continuum but the selections in
the other line segments do not increase the cardinality [32].
The figure just constructed, see Figure 1, is a concentric, alternating se-
quence of an ith annulus and an ith circle, with an empty unit disc at the
centre. We call the union of an annulus and its circle a “band” and we refer to
the whole figure as a “rainbow” in anticipation of variants that are taken, not
over a full rotation, but over an arc.
Many variations on this construction are possible. We might want to: let
the angle range over more than a full rotation so that the windings encode a
countable infinitude of partitions of all possible worlds; let the angle range over
some quantity other than an integral number of full rotations so that both the
lower and upper bounds of the range are included in the range; take the angle
about zero so that it can be constructed by a Lie group [1]; take the angle in
the range −pi/2 ≤ θ ≤ pi/2 or θ = Φ so that it is in the principal range of
the transreal arctangent [7]. We might want to define some other planar shape
entirely.
2.5 Partitioning, Significance and Consistency
One way to handle inconsistent predicates is to partition them into internally
consistent partitions [26]. Da Costa [13] uses a hierarchy of such partitions. The
partitions may be constructed syntactically or by semantic relevance [19][25][27].
Self evidently this produces islands of consistent reasoning but it does more.
Priest [26] discusses the well known preface paradox in which an author writes
a book containing many statements, which the author has good grounds to
believe are true, but who also writes, in the preface, that in any list of many
statements there must be errors. Thus the author is in the paradoxical, or
paraconsistent, position of believing every single one of the statements and
not believing, actually disbelieving, the conjunction of all of the statements.
This paradox is dissolved by Williams [33] who points out that a human can
rationally believe a set of statements and not believe their conjunction. He cites
the example of a motorcycle rider who knows a certain route that involves a
left-hand bend followed by a right-hand bend. The rider successfully negotiates
the route. Over time the rider comes to learn the conjunction that the left-hand
bend is followed by the right-hand bend and changes behaviour to take the faster
‘racing line’ through the switchback. Thus it is human experience that one can
know many propositions and not know their conjunction. Hence there is no
mystery in the fact that a human can believe inconsistent predicates if he or she
has not derived a contradiction. This issue is taken up in a description of how
autoepistemic reasoning can be implemented in a finite (Prolog) implementation
of a system’s own beliefs [22]. Thus we have reason to expect that human and
all finite reasoning may contain inconsistent statements and that one way to
handle them is via partitioning.
There is a simpler way to handle inconsistencies using arithmetic. Suppose
we have the sentence “p & ¬p.” If we handle this sentence algebraically we may
conclude, by conjunction elimination, that p is True and ¬p is True, regardless
of whether the truth values are classical or paraconsistent. But if we evaluate
this proposition arithmetically we have either T & F = F or F & T = F,
the conjunction fails, so we cannot derive a contradiction. Hence reasoning
arithmetically blocks the derivation of contradictions but reasoning algebraically
may admit them. It is no surprise, then, if human reasoning has evolved to be
particular, working on concrete mental models, rather than having great facility
in general reasoning [21].
Suppose we reason arithmetically and keep a record of the serial or parallel
sequence of points we visit in a logical space. Then the trace is necessarily
consistent because it was derived arithmetically. In a biological system, we
might reinforce all of the neurones in the trace [14]; in a computer system we
store the trace as a collection of line segments. In paraconsistent terms the
trace is a partition. If we find more than one line segment passing through a
point then all of the traces are consistent at that point and we may combine
the common parts of the traces. The common parts form a partition that have
been consistent over the entire history of the arithmetical reasoning system.
If all of the components on an axis in logical space are negative then all of
the system’s history supports the conclusion that the predicate tied to the axis
is more False than True; if positive then the predicate is historically more True
than False; if there are components that are both positive and negative then
the predicate is historically contradictory or paraconsistent. Hence a reason-
ing system that has sufficient geometrical or algebraic power may detect the
inconsistency or paraconsistency. If many traces haven components in this axis
then a contradiction or paraconsistency is important to the mental life of the
system. This bears on a case discussed by Priest [26]. Bohr’s model of the atom
is useful in predicting atomic structure and is, in our terms, associated with
many traces. Maxwell’s equations are useful in electrodynamics and are also
associated with many traces. But the two are inconsistent in that the orbit of
a Bohr electron should decay due to Maxwell radiation, which it does not. The
non-decay is therefore significant, because it is associated with many traces,
and finds resolution in the combination of quantal energy levels and the Pauli
exclusion principle. Thus logical space offers a measure of the significance of
a predicate, in terms of the number of traces that pass through it in logical
space, and we now arrive at a measure which classifies classical and dialetheaic
consistencies. Let our desideratum be d = p & ¬p. If d = −∞ then predicate p
is a classical consistency; if −∞ < d < 0 then p is a dialetheaic consistency; if
d = 0 then p is both a dialetheaic consistency and a dialetheaic contradiction;
if 0 < d < ∞ then p is dialetheaic contradiction; if d = ∞ then p is a classical
contradiction; if d = Φ then p is a Gap.
2.6 Advanced Paraconsistent Logics
We have deliberately introduced an elementary paraconsistent logic. It is just
strong enough to generalise propositional logic [23] to paraconsistent form but
this means it is a basis for generalising more advanced paraconsistent logics. For
example the computer language, Prolog [12], provides a propositional logic [23]
with existential and universal quantifies introduced by controlling the scope of
variables. Variables with scope local to a clause are existential, while variables
with global scope are universal [31] (p. 10). Any propositional logic is trivially
extended by the paraconsistent logic presented here but the example of Prolog
raises a deeper issue. Prolog works by unifying variables with arguments. The
unification triggers execution of the clause but in a paraconsistent logic, such as
ours, all paraconsistent truth values will unify with arguments to some extent.
One way to handle this would be to allow all clauses to execute in parallel but
it is unlikely that a practical machine would have the resources to do this for
many clauses. A more practical approach might be to allow only the execution of
clauses that have a high degree of truthfulness, embedding a best-first strategy
in the execution of the computer language. Triggering on truthfulness reflects
the human bias for positive reasoning but in an artificial intelligence we may
prefer to trigger on a high degree of divergence from being equally False and
True. In a practical system we might want some measure of usefulness, expected
value [17], or subjective value [14] to drive the selection of clauses, in which case
we could couple a value parameter with clauses. This takes us deeply into the
design of robots and the modelling of animal and artificial intelligences.
The matching of all paraconsistent truth values to a clause’s variables leads
us to expect that useful paraconsistent logics will have some implicit or explicit
notion of execution control, raising the prospect that they should be as power-
ful as the Turing machine. Clearly paraconsistent logics can be very powerful,
taking them a very long way from the elementary, paraconsistent logic intro-
duced here. Our paraconsistent logic may be of interest precisely because of
its mathematical simplicity. We invite the reader to consider if more compe-
tent, paraconsistent logics, would benefit from being arithmetised in transreal
arithmetic rather than calling on the advanced, even heroic, mathematics that
is usually used as a consistent basis for a paraconsistent logic.
3 Conclusion
We present a paraconsistent logic by arithmetising the Sheffer Stroke in tran-
sreal arithmetic. We use negative infinity to model classical False and positive
infinity to model classical True. The real numbers model truth values that are
both False and True. The negative, real numbers are more False than True; the
positive, real numbers are more True than False; zero models the truth value
that is equally False and True. The transreal number nullity, which is unordered
and lies outside the range of ordered numbers from negative infinity to positive
infinity, models truth values that have no component of falsity or truthfulness.
These Gap truth values are neither False nor True. As the Sheffer Stroke can
be used to develop all classical, truth functional logics, our logic is just one of
a class of paraconsistent generalisations of classical logic. The reader, who is
skilled in formal logic, can easily develop other paraconsistent logics using tran-
sreal arithmetic as a consistent basis. This is a very much simpler approach to
the formalisation of paraconsistent logics than is usually attempted so it brings
paraconsistent logics within the reach of non-specialists, such as Electronic En-
gineers and Computer Scientists, who have been trained in classical, Boolean
logic.
The Sheffer Stroke directly implements the operation Not-And (NAND).
NAND gates can be used to implement all of the logic in general purpose com-
puters so our paraconsistent generalisation of the Sheffer Stroke specifies the
behaviour of a paraconsistent NAND gate. This could be used to implement
paraconsistent processors in hardware. Such hardware might be particularly
well suited to the execution of Artificial Intelligence and Cybernetics programs,
for example those which exploit models of neural processing or fuzzy logic.
We give a geometrical construction which encodes all paraconsistent, possible
worlds in an alternating sequence of an annulus and a circle that fills out the
real plane, with each radius marking off one possible world.
We point out the obvious property that evaluation of logical sentences in-
volving only connectives and literal False and True values, not variables, cannot
support the conclusion of a contradiction. Thus on-the-fly evaluation of a lit-
eral sentence is always consistent. We propose that this property can be used
to partition predicates into internally consistent sets and that this provides a
measure of the significance of predicates. We also give a simple, transarith-
metical measure, a desideratum, d = p & ¬p, for categorising predicates into
classical or else dialetheaic form and for categorising classical or else dialetheaic
consistencies and contradictions.
We give a very simple principle of metalogical monotonicity that forces a
logic to be non-explosive. In future we might examine existing paraconsistent
logics to see if they implicitly obey this principle.
Given the interest there is in the number nullity, perhaps the single most
important, original contribution of this paper is to observe that the transreal
number nullity provides a faithful model of Gap values in advanced logics.
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